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NOTES AND COMMENTS

being paid by provision in a will. If such a provision is made and the
will is later destroyed, there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to
pay and to be paid; and the claimant does not have to wait until death
to bring an action for recovery.2 8 Where the testator has made it impossible to fulfill the contract by conveying substantial portions of the
property to other parties, the one rendering the services can still re2
cover for the reasonable value thereof under the common counts. 9
In the Francis0 case it would have been manifestly unjust to prevent recovery by the presumption of gratuity. The absence of a reciprocity of benefits is evidence that the plaintiff did not intend gratuity,
and the statement by deceased that he expected plaintiff to be paid out
of his estate adquately shows an implied contract.
CEcIL J. HILL.
Garnishment-Bank Directors--Bank Stock

Action by M, judgment creditor, to garnish $1,000 worth of bank
stock deposited with defendant bank by its owner, a director of the
bank, as required by a state statute1 From a holding that the bank
stock was exempt from garnishment, and an order discharging the
bank as garnishee, M appeals. Held, one judge dissenting, reversed.
The bank stock is subject to garnishment.2
This case squarely presents the question of whether or not bank
stock owned by a judgment debtor, and held by the bank, to qualify
him as a director in the bank can be garnished. It appears that the
rule was well settled at common law that stock in a corporation was not
subject to attachment or garnishment. This rule was based on the
theory that choses in action could not be attached and in those states
allowing attachment or garnishment of choses in action corporate stock
could not be garnisheed unless the statute provided for it,3 and the
courts made no distinction between bank stock and any other corporate
stock in applying this rule. However, it, like so many other common
law rules, has been displaced by statute, in most states, which expressly or impliedly provide, or have been construed by the courts to
provide that shares of stock in a corporation may be attached or gar8 "Einolfv. Thompson, 95 Minn. 230, 103 N. W. 1026 (1905).
" Patterson v. Franklin, 168 N. C. 75, 84 S. E. 18 (1915) ; accord, Messier v.
Messier, 34 R. I. 233, 82 Ati. 996 (1912).
" Francis v. Francis, 223 N. C. 401, 26 S. E. (2d) 907 (1943).

ILL STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 1632, §4.
'Molner v. South Chicago Savings Bank, 138 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 7th,
1943).
84 Am. JuR. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759; cf. Elgart v. Mintz, 123 N. J. E. 404, 197
Atl. 747 (Ch. 1938) ; Lambert v. Huff, A. & T. Co., 82 W. Va. 362, 95 S. E. 1031

(1918).
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nished. The statutes nor the courts do not appear to distinguish between bank stock or any other form of corporation stock. As a result
the generally accepted view today is that shares of stock in a corporation
are subject to attachment or garnishment just as any other property
or claims which the judgment debtor has.4 It must be remembered,
however, that the right to attach or garnish shares of stock, if it exists
at all, depends on and is measured by the statute.5
The case which we have before us differs from the usual one involving attachment or garnishment of stock shares in that the stock
sought to be garnished was owned by the director and held by the
bank pursuant to a state statute. The relevant part of this statute
reads thus: "Every director of any bank .. . must own in his own
right, free from lien or encumberance, shares of the capital stock of
the bank ...of which he is a director, the aggregate par value of which
shall not be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) and the stock certificates evidencing . . . (such shares) shall be filed unendorsed and
unassigned by him with the cashier of such bank during his term as
director. Any director who ceases to be the owner of capital of such
bank.., of the aggregate par values of one thousand dollars ($1,000)
or becomes in any form disqualified, shall vacate his place as such director." 6 Does the presence of this statute have any effect on the
general rule, or does it warrant a holding that the stock is not garnishable?
The correct answer to this query would seem to depend upon the
question of what is the proper construction of the statute and the applicability and effect of certain principles of the law of garnishment.
Most of the states have statutes similar to the Illinois statutes requiring that bank directors own stock in the bank of which they are a
director,r* but it appears to be the only one which requires that the
"Alexander v. Livestock National Bank, 282 Ill. App. 315 (1935), (1936) 3
U. CHL L. REV. 511; 4 Amr. Jut. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10
FLrcnER, PIvATE CoapoRaTioNs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759.
'4 Am. JuR. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §351; 10 FinrcHER, PRIvATE
CORP0RATioNs (perm. ed. 1931) §4759.
'ILL STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 16Y2, §4.
7*The statutes listed in this footnote are grouped, roughly though not com-

pletely accurately, according to the amount of stock which a bank director in
that state must own. (1) $200 par value bank stock: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1940) tit. 5, §185; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) §3805. (2) $500 par value bank stock:
ARIz. CODE ANN. (1939) §51-219 ($200 if bank is in town of less than 20,000
people); ARic. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §714; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §25-406;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, 1934) §18-510 ($1,000 if bank has over $50,000 capital
stock) ; IOWA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) §9217-2 ($200 if bank has less than
$30,000 capital stock); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Corrick 1935) §9-104; Ky. REV.
STAT. (1942) §287.060(d); MD. CODE ANN. (Flack, 19395 art. 11, §6- N. J.STAT.
ANN. (1939) §17: 4-46; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §221(c) ($200 if bank
has less than $15,000 capital stock) ; OHio GEN. CODE.ANx. (Page, 1937) §710-65;
R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) §132-1; S. D. CODE (1939) §6.0315; UTAH CODE
ANN. (1943) tit. 7-3-21 ($200 if bank is not in city of first or second class). (3)

1943]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

stock be deposited with anyone, bank official or otherwise. The presence of this factor might seem to lessen the value of a discussion of
this problem since the question of garnishment can arise only when
property of the judgment debtor is in the hands of a third party. However, in those states which do not have provisions similiar to those
embodied in the Uniform Stock Transfer Acts the problem before us
could arise, for in the absence of such provisions for attachment and
levy the common law rule that stock could be reached by garnishment
proceedings against the corporation would apply. Also, it appears that
even in those states having the Uniform Stock Transfer Act a judgment creditor could, by first securing an injunction against the transfer
of the stock, resort to garnishment against the corporation to satisfy
his claim. 9 Further, if the creditor resorted to a direct proceeding
against the debtor his rights to the stock would depend on the debtor's
rights since his rights should be no greater than those of the debtor.
The widespread policy of requiring bank directors to own a stipu-

lated amount of stock in the bank of which they are a director is described thus by Morse in his work on Banks and Banking: "A method
frequently resorted to for securing the fidelity of directors in the exercise of their duties is to require them to own in their own right and
unencumbered a certain number of the shares of the corporation."' 1
$1,000 par value bank stock: IL&. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 1632, §4;
MASS. ANN. LAws (Michie, Supp. 1942) c. 172A, §3; Mic. STAT. ANN. (Henderson, 1936) §23.19 ($300 if bank has less than $25,000 capital stock) ; MINx. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) §7670 ($500 if bank has less than $25,000 capital stock) ; MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §6014.15; NEv. Comp. LAws (Hillyer,
1929) §659; N. Y. BANKING LAW §116; OKLA.STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1943) tit. 6, §94
($500 if bank has capital stock of less than $25,000) ; Tax. ANN. REv. Civ. STAT.
Vernon, 1925) art. 388 ($500 if bank has capital stock of less than $17,500);
Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §10-209 (Savings Associations). (4)
Shares of stock of no certain value: COLO. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 18, §12

(5 shares if bank has capital stock of less than $30,000; 10 shares if capital stock

is over $30,000); DEr- REv. CODE (1935) §2305 (No specified number of shares
required) ; Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) p. 7585, §5363 (2 shares if bank has capital
stock of less than $25,000; 5 shares if capital stock is over $25,000) ; N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) §52-208 (10 shares) ; S. C. CODE (1942) §7748 (10 shares) ; WASH.
Ray. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §3237 (5 shares if bank has capital stock
of less than $50,000; if over $50,000, 10 shares); (5) Miscellaneous: NED. Com,.
LAWS (Dorsey, 1929) §8-121 (Each director must own stock equal to 4% of the
capital stock of the bank if the capital stock is less than $50,000; $3,000 worth
of stock if capital stock of the bank is more than $50,000) ; PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit.
7, §819 ($3,000 worth of stock) ; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie &
Sublett, 1937) §4149(19) ($100 worth of stock for each $10,000 worth of capital
stock if capital stock of bank is less than $50,000; $500 for each $10,000 worth of
capital stock of capital stock is over $50,000 and less than $100,000; $750 for each
$10,000 worth of capital stock if total capital stock is more than $100,000 and
less than $300,000; $1,000 for each $10,000 worth of capital stock if total capital
stock is more than $300,000).
86 U. L. A. §13.
"Rioux v. Cronin, 222 Mass. 131, 109 N. E. 898 (1915) ; cf. Elgart v. Mintz,
124 N. J. E. 136, 200 Ad. 488 (Ch. 1938).
101 MoRsE, BANKS & BANKING (6th ed. 1928) §138.
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This seems to be a fairly accurate description of the purpose of such
statutes. Since the amount of stock which these statutes require a director to own would almost invariably constitute only a small percent
of the total liability of the bank it is doubted if the legislatures intended,
by such statutes, to provide a fund out of which those holding claims
against the bank, in case of insolvency, could be indemnified. The
applicability of this observation to the Illinois statute is borne out by
the fact that the amount of stock which a director is required to own
does not vary, regardless of the size of the bank.l* Furthermore, in
the event that the bank should collapse, the shares themselves would be
practically worthless with the result that creditors of the bank could
realize very little or, more likely nothing from them. Of course, in the
event that a director did some act for which he was liable to a still
solvent bank such a deposit would provide an easily accessible source
of indemnification up to the value of the director's stock. Even so,
had the purpose of the statute been to provide an indemnity fund it
seems that the legislature would not only have required that a much
larger amount of stock be owned by the director, but also that there
be a close ratio between the amount of stock the directors must own
and the size of the bank. The wording of the statute fails to indicate
that it has any purpose other than to curtail improper and unwise acts
by the directors by the expedient of.requiring them to own stock in
the bank in the hope that such will give them a personal interest that
they might not have otherwise and thereby more nearly assure that the
directors will discharge their duties faithfully and with the best interests of the bank in mind. The situation before us is not at all analogous to the one presented by an attempt to garnish a bond deposited
with a state officer, pursuant to a statute, by an insurance company
doing business within the state.12 * Such a bond is in the hands of a
state official, usually the treasurer, and therefore is not subject to garnishment since it is considered to be in the hands of the law.' 3 Further,
such statutes usually state that the bond is held as indemnity for the
citizens of the state to whom the insurance company may be liable.
It has been held that such bonds are not subject to attachment or garnishment.14 Such a holding seems to be entirely consistent with the
purpose of the statute.
1* Some states do make a variation in the amount of stock a director must
own depending on the size of the bank of which he is a director. But in no
instance, except possibly Virginia, is the amount required of a size that would
indicate that the purpose of the requirement was to provide an indemnity fund.
See note 8 supra.
12* Defendant in the present action argued that it was an analogous situation.
For an example of a statute of this type see VA. CoDE ANN. (Michie & Sublett,
1936) §4201.
" 4 Am. Jup. (1936), Attachment & Garnishment, §386 et. seq.
"tBuck v. Gurantors' Liability Indemnity Co., 97 Va. 719, 34 S. E. 950 (1900).
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One of the most important aspects of this problem is the question
of whether or not the director is free to resign at will, for, as it will
appear later, the judgment debtor's, and thus the creditor's, rights in
this stock will depend on whether or not he could resign from his position as director whenever he desired. Since the statute is silent on
this proposition its determination depends on the construction to be
given the statute. The statute provides that the directors are elected
to serve as "managers for one year and until their successors are
elected,"' 15 but this does not provide a basis for a holding, one way or
the other, on this point. Thus we must look to the general rules governing the right of a director to resign. It is a well established principle that directors of a corporation are free to resign at will, provided
there is nothing to the contrary in the charter or by-laws of the corporation or a statute ;16 and it does not matter what form the resignation takes provided that the charter or by-laws, or a statute, do not
require it to follow a prescribed form. 17 This rule applies to bank
directors just as to any corporation directors.ls* Unless the resignation is worded to take effect only upon acceptance, there is a vacancy
of the office as soon as notice of the resignation is communicated to the
proper officials, 19 even if the resignation has not been accepted and the
by-laws or charter of the corporation, or a statute, 20 require that the
21
director remain in office until a successor is duly elected and qualified.
There are, of course, certain instances in which a director cannot exercise this privilege, 2 2 but it does not appear that there were any such
circumstances in the present case. The absence of any provision in
STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 16Y2, §4.
18 13 Am. JuR. (1938), Corporations, §883; 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
'1ILr.

(perm. ed. 1931) §345; for an extended note on this point see: Westwood,
Resignation of Corporate Officers (1936) 22 VA. L. Ray. 527.

"'Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 622 (1941); Bell v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 43 S. W. (2d) 290, 293 (1931) ; 13 Am. JuR. (1938), Corporations, §884; 2 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (perm. ed. 1931) §346.
"*Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891).
In holding that a director of a national bank was not precluded from resigning
within the year, even though he had been elected for a one year term and until
his successor was elected the court said: "We do not understand that because
§5154 of the Revised Statutes provides that directors shall hold office for one
year, and until their successors have been elected and qualified this prohibited
resignations
during the year....."
18

International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1898);
Lincoln Court Realty Co. v. Kentucky Title, Savings Bank & Trust Co., 169
Ky. 840, 185 S. W. 156 (1916) ; 13 Am. JurL (1938), Corporations, §885.
"Briggs v. Spaulding 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891);
Dubois v. Century Cement Products Co., 119 N. J. E. 472, 183 Atl. 188 (1936).
"Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S. 132, 11 Sup. Ct. 924, 35 L. ed. 662 (1891);
International Bank of St. Louis v. Faber, 86 Fed. 443 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1898) ; 13
AM. JuR. (1938), Corporations, §886. Contra: Timolat v. Held, 40 N. Y. Supp.
692 (1896).
"' Zeltner v. Zeltner Brewing Co., 174 N. Y. Supp. 338, 66 N. E. 810 (1903);
1 MORAWETZ, CoRPoRArIONS (1852) §563; cf. Carnaghan v. Export & Prod. Oil
Co., 11 N. Y. Supp. 172 (1890).
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the statute regulating the right to resign indicates that the legislature
did not intend to change the general rule as to this right. Thus it is
suggested that the court was correct in proceeding on the theory that
the director was free to resign whenever he desired.
As has already been pointed out the question of the director's right
to resign is closely connected with those principles of garnishment which
are relevant to the problem at hand. It is a cardinal principle of the
law of garnishment that the garnishor has no greater rights against the
garnishee than the judgment debtor would have, 28 except as provided
for by statute2 4 or when there has been fraud affecting the rights of
the creditor with the result that he has equities which lift his rights
above those of the debtor. 25 Illinois is in accord with this rule.20 *
Thus it has been held that a garnishee can assert against the garnishor
any defenses that he might have asserted against the judgment debtor,
and if the debtor, at the time of'the answer to the garnishment, could
not recover then the garnishor cannot.27 A further rule of garnishment
" Nrth Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596. 14 Sup.
Ct. 710, 38 L. ed. 565 (1894) ; accord, United 'States v. Bank of United States, 5

F. Supp. 942 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Green v. Green, 108 Colo. 110, 113 P. (2d)
427 (1941) ; Goodwin v. Clayton, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 175 (1904) ; State Bank
of New Salem v. Schultze, 51 N. D. 66, 199 N. W. 138 (1924).
4 Pullman v. Railway Equipment Co., 73 Ill. App. 313 (1897).
2
Jasper Land Co. v. Riddlesperger, 26 Ala. App. 191, 157 So. 231 (1934),
cert. denied, 229 Ala. 331, 157 So. 233 (1934) ; Booker T. Washington Burial Ins.
Co. v. Roberts, 228 Ala. 206, 153 So. 409 (1934) ; Fosdick v. Robertson, 91 Conn.
571, 100 At. 1059 (1917) ; Crane v. Illinois Merchant's Trust Co., 238 Ill. App.
257 (1925).
"*Schmitz v. 75th & Exchange Drug Co., 303 Ill. App. 192, 196, 24 N. E. (2d)
889, 891 (1940) where the court said: "It is a well established rule that the creditor stands in exactly the same attitude in relation to a garnished fund that the
judgment debtor does, and can enforce only such rights as the debtor might enforce. The right of the creditor against the garnishee cannot, by garnishment,
rise higher than the right of the debtor against the garnishee. If the right of
debtor is subject to the right of the garnishee, the right of the creditor is subject
to the same right. The one exception of this rule occurs when there has been
a fraudulent transfer of property."; Patton v. Washington Ins. Exchange, 288
Ill. App. 594, 6 N. E. (2d) 472 (1937); Matton Grocery Co. v. Struckmeyer &
Olson. 326 Ill. 602, 158 N. E. 422 (1927); Hibernian Banking Ass'n. v. Marrison,
188 11. 279, 58 N. E. 296 (1899); Supreme Sitting, Order of Iron Hall, v.
Grigsby,
178 Ill. 522, 47 N. E. 855, 59 Am. St. Rep. 309 (1897).
2
Chicago Ridirg Club for Use of Klein v. Avery, 305 Ill. App. 419, 27 N. E.
(2d) 636 (1940); First Nat. Bank v. Hanhemann Institutions of Chicago, 356
Ill. 366, 190 N. E. 707 (1934) ; Schneider v. Autoist Mut. Ins. Co., 346 Ill. 137,
178 N. E. 466 (1931); Dennison v. Taylor, 142 Ill. 45, 31 N. E. 148 (1892);
accord, Zink v. Black Star Line, Inc., 18 F. (2d) 156 (App. D. C. 1927), cert.
denied, 275 U. S. 527, 48 Sup. Ct. 20, 72 L. ed. 408 (1927) ; Fidelity Trust Co. v.
New York Finance Co., 125 Fed. 275 (C..C. A. 3rd, 1903); First Security Bank
of Pocatello v. Zaring Farm & Livestock Co., 51 Idaho 700, 10 P. (2d) 303
(1932) ; Paul Davis Dry Goods Co. v. Paul, 205 Iowa 491, 218 N. W. 276 (1928) ;
Scurry v. Quaker Oats Co., 201 Iowa 1171, 208 N. W. 860 (1926); Gentry v.
Le Clair, 120 Kan. 183, 250 Pac. 257 (1926); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Commercial
Credit Co. 252 Ky. 539, 67 S. W. (2d) 676 (1934); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Hightower, 211 Ky. 36, 276 S. W. 1063, 44 A. L. R. 1158, 1161 (1925) ; Silverman v. Grinell, 165 La. 587, 115 So. 789 (1928); Employers Liability Assur.
Corp. Limited v. Perkins, 169 Md. 269, 181 Atl. 436 (1935); Braniff Inv. Co. v.
Carter, 118 Okla. 599, 75 P. (2d) 439 (1937).
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is the principle that the proceeding will not lie against the garnishee
unless he is indebted to the debtor without contingency or uncertainty
at the date when the answer to the garnishment suit is filed. 2 8 If these
principles are applied in the light of the construction that we have
placed on the statute, to wit, that the director was free to resign at will,
then no reason for holding that the stock was not garnishable appears.
If the director can resign whenever it suits his fancy then it can hardly
be argued that he does not have a right to the stock. And since he has
an absolute right to the stock, so does the creditor. If, however, he
cannot resign at will, then it seems that the stock should not be subjected to garnishment for he would have no right to the stock and
neither would his creditor. One uncertainty that complicates this aspect of the matter is the question of whether or not the director's right
to the stock accrues as soon as he resigns. The preceeding remarks
were made on the theory that it did. But if, after his resignation, the
bank had a right to retain the stock until it had been determined that
there was no liability on the part of the director, which would attach
to the stock, then it seems that the stock should not be subjected to
garnishment. In such a case the director would have no right to the
stock until this had been determined; thus the creditor should not be
able to garnish it before that time.
On the basis of these observations it does not seem that there are
any evident reasons to be gained from the statute which free such bank
stock from garnishment. Neither do any of the relevant principles of
garnishment seem to warrant, in view of what we -deem a proper construction of the statute, a contrary decision. Thus it is submitted that
the holding in the instant case is proper and in accord with the general
law of garnishment, even though it does permit a third party to deprive
a bank of a director and a director of his position, irrespective of his
value to the bank. However, it is suggested that the statute involved
could be improved and clarified by certain amendments. It seems that
it would be wise to incorporate into it some definite provision as to
the rights of a director to resign during his term of office. Furthermore, a provision requiring that the stock remain in the hands of the
cashier for a definite period after the director resigned, provided the
right to resign is not abrogated entirely, would be an improvement on
"8Keck v. Vogt, 108 Colo. 386, 117 P. (2d) 1005 (1941) ; Wetten v. Horix,
309 Ill. App. 535, 33 N. E. (2d) 615 (1941) ; Zimek v. Illinois National Casualty
Co., 370 Ill. 572, 19 N. E. (2d) 620 (1939); Wheeler v. Chicago Title & Trust

Co., 217 Ill. 128, 75 N. E. 455 (1905) ; accord, Malone v. Moore, 204 Iowa 625,

215 N. W. 625, 55 A. L. R. 356, 361 (1927) ; McKnight Co. v. Tomkinson, 209

Minn. 299, 286 N. W. 659 (1941); Salyers Auto Co. v. De Vore, 116 Neb. 317,
217 N. W. 94, 56 A. L. R. 594, 601 (1927); Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western
Wholesale Notions Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032, 60 A.L.R. 881, 884 (1928);
But cf. Anderson v. Dugger, 130 Kan. 356, 285 Pac. 546 (1930).
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the statute in its present form. Such a provision would eliminate the
possibility of a director doing an act for which he might be liable and
then resigning and withdrawing and disposing of his stock before his
liability attached to it. Also, this would afford some protection to the
bank, its stockholders, and depositors in that it would provide an easily
accessible fund out of which some indemnification could be had in the
event that the director was liable for some act of malfeasance or misfeasance during his directorship. In the event that a provision to this
effect was adopted it seems that the stock could not be subjected to
garnishment for the debtor-director, and thus the creditor, would have
no right to the stock until the prescribed period had passed. Also,
until this period had elapsed any claim which the director had on the
stock would be subject to the contingency of whether or not any liability would be determined, and this would defeat garnishment proceedings by a creditor.
WILLIAm A. JOHNSON.

